Abstract: This paper presents a summary overview of the fast-developing¯eld of arti¯cial life, stressing aspects especially relevant for the study of decentralized market economies. In particular, a recently developed trade network game (TNG) is used to illustrate how the basic arti¯cial life paradigm might be specialized to economics. The TNG traders choose and refuse trade partners on the basis of continually updated expected utility, engage in risky trades modelled as two-person games, and evolve their trade behavior over time. Analytical and simulation work is reported to indicate how the TNG is currently being used to study the evolutionary implications of alternative market structures at three di®erent levels: individual trade behavior; trade network formation; and social welfare.
Introduction
What is arti¯cial life, or alife for short? And why should economists care?
As detailed in the entertaining monographs by Levy (1992) and Sigmund (1993) , the roots of alife go at least as far back as the work of John von Neumann in the nineteen forties on self-replicating automata. The establishment of alife as a distinct¯eld of inquiry, however, must be traced to the¯rst alife conference, organized in 1987 by Chris Langton at the Los Alamos National Laboratory; see Langton (1989) .
Alife is the bottom-up study of basic phenomena commonly associated with living organisms, such as self-replication, evolution, adaptation, self-organization, parasitism, competition, cooperation, and social network formation. Alife complements the traditional biological and social sciences concerned with the analytical, laboratory, and¯eld study of living organisms by attempting to simulate or synthesize life-like behavior within computers, robots, and other man-made media. One goal is to enhance the understanding of actual and potential life processes. A second goal is to use nature as an inspiration for the development of solution algorithms for di±cult optimization problems characterized by high-dimensional search domains, nonlinearities, and multiple local optima.
The systems studied by alife researchers are complex adaptive systems sharing many of the following characteristics [Holland, 1992] . Most importantly, each such system typically consists of many dispersed units acting in parallel with no global controller responsible for the behavior of all units. Rather, the actions of each unit depend upon the states and actions of a limited number of other units, and the overall direction of the system is determined by competition and coordination among the units subject to structural constraints. The complexity of the system thus tends to arise more from the interactions among the units than from any complexity inherent in the individual units per se. Moreover, the local interaction networks connecting individual units are continuously recombined and revised. In particular, niches that can be exploited by particular adaptations are continuously created, and their exploitation in turn leads to new niche creations, so that perpetual novelty exists.
Brie°y put, then, alife research tends to focus on continually evolving systems whose global behavior arises from the local interactions of distributed units; this is the sense in which alife research is said to be bottom up. Although the units comprising the systems might be bit strings, molecules, or robotic insects, the abstract description of how the unit interactions result in global behavior is clearly reminiscent of a Schumpeterian economy, only¯ltered through an unfamiliar terminology.
The study of evolutionary economies has of course been pursued by many researchers in addition to Joseph Schumpeter. For example, one has Armen Alchian's work on uncertainty and evolution in economic systems, the work of W. Brian Arthur on economies incorporating positive feedbacks, the work by Richard Day on dynamic economies characterized by complex phase transitions, the work by John Foster on an evolutionary approach to macroeconomics, Ron Heiner's work on the origins of predictable behavior, Jack Hirshleifer's work on evolutionary models in economics and law, and Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter's work on an evolutionary theory of economic change. These and numerous other related studies are reviewed by Witt (1993) and Nelson (1995) . In addition, as detailed in Friedman (1991) , a number of researchers have recently been focusing on the potential economic applicability of evolutionary game theory in which game strategies distributed over a¯xed number of strategy types reproduce over time in direct proportion to their relative¯tness.
Economists have recently begun to apply the alife paradigm to the computational study of evolutionary economic processes. Exploiting the recent advent of object-oriented programming languages such as C++ and Java, these "agent-based computational economics" (ACE) researchers have been able to extend previous evolutionary economics work in several directions. 2 First, much greater attention is generally focused on the endogenous determination of agent interactions. Second, a broader range of interactions is typically considered, with cooperative and predatory associations increasingly taking center stage along with price and quantity relationships. Third, agent actions and interactions are represented with a greater degree of abstraction, permitting generalizations across speci¯c system applications. Fourth, the evolutionary process is generally expressed algorithmically in terms of genetic (recombination and/or mutation) operations acting directly on agent characteristics. These evolutionary selection pressures result in the continual creation of new modes of behavior and an ever-changing network of agent interactions. For example, the basic \genetic algorithm" used in many ACE studies evolves a new population of agents from an existing population of agents using the following four steps: (1) Evaluation, in which a¯tness score is assigned to each agent in the population; (2) Selection for Reproduction, in which a subset of the existing population of agents is selected for reproduction, with selection biased in favor of¯tness; (3) Recombination, in which o®spring (new ideas) are generated by combining the genetic material (structural characteristics) of pairs of parents chosen from among the most¯t agents in the population; and (4) Mutation, in which additional variations are introduced into the population by mutating the structural characteristics of each o®spring with some small probability. See Goldberg (1989) and Mitchell and Forrest (1994) . The central problem for ACE researchers is to understand the apparently spontaneous appearance of regularity in economic processes, such as the unplanned coordination of trading activities in decentralized market economies that economists associate with Adam Smith's invisible hand. The challenge is to explain how these global regularities arise from the local interactions of autonomous agents channeled through actual or potential economic institutions rather than through¯ctitious coordinating mechanisms such as a single representative consumer. In line with this challenge, rationality is generally viewed as a testable hypothesis, or at least as a debatable methodological assumption, rather than as an unquestioned axiom of individual behavior.
Several studies that focus on key ACE-related issues have either appeared or are in the pipeline. Marks (1992) , McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1997,1999) , Miller (1989) , Routledge (1994) , Sargent (1993) , Tesfatsion (1997) , and Vriend (1995) .
To illustrate more concretely the potential usefulness of the ACE approach, as well as the hurdles that remain to be cleared, the following two sections brie°y outline some ongoing ACE work that appears to be particularly relevant for the modelling of decentralized market economies. Section 2 describes recent attempts to combine evolutionary game theory with preferential partner selection ; Smucker et al. (1994) ; and Ashlock et al. (1996) ]. Section 3 discusses how a modi¯ed version of this framework is being used to study the endogenous formation and evolution of trade networks [Tesfatsion (1997) , McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1997,1999) ]. Concluding comments are given in Section 4.
Evolutionary IPD with Choice and Refusal
Following the seminal work of Axelrod (1984 Axelrod ( , 1987 , the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game has been extensively used by economists and other researchers to explore the potential emergence of mutually cooperative behavior among non-altruistic agents. As detailed in Kirman (1997) and Lindgren and Nordahl (1994) , these studies have typically assumed that individual players have no control over whom they play. Rather, game partners are generally determined by an extraneous matching mechanism such as a roulette wheel, a neighborhood grid, or a round-robin tournament . The general conclusion reached by these studies has been that mutually cooperative behavior tends to emerge if the number of game iterations is either unknown or in¯nite, the frequency of mutually cooperative play in initial game iterations is su±ciently large, and the perceived probability of future interactions with any given current partner is su±ciently high.
In actuality, however, socio-economic interactions are often characterized by the preferential choice and refusal of partners. The question then arises whether the emergence and long-run viability of cooperative behavior in the IPD game would be enhanced if players were more realistically allowed to choose and refuse their potential game partners.
This question is taken up in Stanley et al. (1994) . The traditional IPD game is extended to an IPD/CR game in which players choose and refuse partners on the basis of continually updated expected payo®s.
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The introduction of partner choice and refusal fundamentally modi¯es the ways in which players interact in the IPD game and the characteristics that result in high payo® scores. Choice allows players to increase their chances of encountering other cooperative players, refusal gives players a way to protect themselves from defections without having to defect themselves, and ostracism of defectors occurs endogenously as an increasing number of players individually refuse the defectors' game o®ers. On the other hand, choice and refusal also permit opportunistic players to home in quickly on exploitable players and form parasitic relationships.
The analytical and simulation¯ndings reported for the IPD/CR game in Stanley et al. (1994) , and in the subsequent studies by Smucker et al. (1994) , Ashlock et al. (1996) , and Hauk (1996) , indicate that the overall emergence of cooperation is accelerated in evolutionary IPD games by the introduction of choice and refusal. Nevertheless, the underlying player interaction patterns induced by choice and refusal can be complex and time varying, even when expressed play behavior is largely cooperative. Consequently, it has proven to be extremely di±cult to get an analytical handle on the mapping from parameter con¯gurations to evolutionary IPD/CR outcomes. A reasonable next step, then, is to focus on more concrete problem settings which impose natural constraints on the range of feasible player interactions. In the next section it is shown how a modi¯ed version of the IPD/CR game is being used to examine the endogenous formation and evolution of trade networks among resource-constrained traders.
A Trade Network Game with Choice and Refusal
The trade network game (TNG) developed in Tesfatsion (1997) consists of successive generations of resourceconstrained traders who choose and refuse trade partners on the basis of continually updated expected payo®s, engage in risky trades modelled as two person games, and evolve their trade strategies over time.
The TNG has been implemented by McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1997,1999) with the support of a general C++ evolutionary simulation framework, SimBioSys, developed by McFadzean (1995) . The TNG facilitates the general study of trade from a bottom up perspective in three key ways. First, the TNG traders are instantiated as autonomous endogenously interacting software agents (tradebots) with internal behavioral functions and with internally stored information that includes addresses for other tradebots. The tradebots can therefore display anticipatory behavior (expectation formation); and they can communicate with each other at event-triggered times, a feature not present in standard economic models. Second, the modular design of the TNG permits experimentation with alternative speci¯cations for market structure, trade partner matching, trading, expectation formation, and trade behavior evolution. All of these speci¯cations can potentially be grounded in tradebot-initiated actions. Third, the evolutionary 3 Other game theory studies that have allowed players to avoid unwanted interactions, or more generally to a®ect the probability of interaction with other players through their own actions, include Fogel (1995) , Guriev and Shakhova (1996) , Hauk (1996) , Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1989) , Kitcher (1993) , Mailath et al. (1994) , and Orbell and Dawes (1993) . A detailed review of this line of work is given in Hauk (1996) . There is also a growing body of work on multi-agent systems with endogenous interactions in which the decision (or state) of an agent depends on the decision (or state) of certain neighboring agents, where these neighbors may change over time. See, for example, Brock and Durlauf (1995) , De Vany (1996), Ioannides (1997) , and Young (1993) .
implications of alternative module speci¯cations can be studied at three di®erent levels: individual tradebot characteristics; trade network formation; and social welfare as measured by descriptive statistics such as average tradebot¯tness. Section 3.1 sets out and motivates the general TNG framework. To gain insight into the subtle interplay between game play and the choice and refusal of partners in the TNG, Section 3.2 presents a detailed analytical study of an illustrative TNG with¯ve tradebots. In particular, it is shown that the parameter space for this illustrative TNG partitions into economically interpretable regions corresponding to qualitatively distinct trade network formations. Section 3.3 reports on some illustrative TNG computer experiments for two alternative market structures: buyer-seller markets in which all tradebots can both make and receive trade o®ers; and two-sided markets in which a subset of buyers makes trade o®ers to a disjoint subset of sellers.
The Basic Trade Network Game
The trade network game (TNG) consists of a collection of tradebots that evolves over time. As depicted in Table 1 , this evolution is implemented through a hierarchy of cycle loops.
Each tradebot in the initial tradebot generation is assigned a random trade strategy and is con¯gured with a prior expected payo® for each of his potential trade partners. The tradebots then engage in a trade cycle loop consisting of a¯xed number of trade cycles. In each trade cycle the tradebots undertake three activities: the determination of trade partners, given current expected payo®s; the carrying out of potentially risky trades; and the updating of expected payo®s based on any new payo®s received during trade partner determination and trading. At the end of the trade cycle loop the tradebots enter into an environmental cycle during which the¯tness score of each tradebot is calculated as the total sum of his payo®s divided by the total number of his payo®s and the current tradebot generation is sorted by¯tness scores. At the end of the environmental cycle, a generation cycle commences during which evolutionary selection pressures are applied to the current tradebot generation to obtain a new tradebot generation with evolved trade strategies. This new tradebot generation is then con¯gured, and another trade cycle loop commences.
The TNG currently uses the particular speci¯cations for market structure, trade partner determination, trade, expectation updating, and trade behavior evolution detailed in Tesfatsion (1997) . For completeness, these speci¯cations are reviewed below.
Alternative market structures are currently imposed in the TNG through the prespeci¯cation of buyers and sellers and through the prespeci¯cation of quotas on o®er submissions and acceptances. More precisely, the set of players for the TNG is the union V = B [ S of a nonempty subset B of buyer tradebots who can submit trade o®ers and a nonempty subset S of seller tradebots who can receive trade o®ers, where B and S may be disjoint, overlapping, or coincident. In each trade cycle, each buyer m can submit up to O m trade o®ers to sellers and each seller n can accept up to A n trade o®ers from buyers, where the o®er quota O m and the acceptance quota A n can be any positive integers.
Although highly simpli¯ed, these parametric speci¯cations permit the TNG to encompass two-sided markets, markets with intermediaries, and markets in which all traders engage in both buying and selling activities. For example, the buyers and sellers might represent customers and retail store owners, workers and¯rms, borrowers and lenders, or barter traders. The o®er quota O m indicates that buyer m has a limited amount of resources (credit, labor time, collateral, apples,...) to o®er, and the acceptance quota A n indicates int main () Table 1 : Pseudo-Code for the TNG that seller n has a limited amount of resources (goods, job openings, loans, oranges,...) to provide in return.
Three illustrations are sketched below.
Case 1: A Two-Sided Labor Market With Endogenous Layo®s and Quits
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The set B consists of M workers and the set S consists of N employers, where B and S are disjoint. Each worker m can make work o®ers to a maximum of O m employers, or he can choose to be unemployed. Each employer n can hire up to A n workers, and employers can refuse work o®ers. Once matched, workers choose on-the-job e®ort levels and employers choose monitoring and penalty levels. An employer¯res one of its current workers by refusing future work o®ers from this worker, and a worker quits his current employer by ceasing to direct work o®ers to this employer. This TNG special case thus extends the standard treatment of labor markets as assignment problems by incorporating subsequent strategic e±ciency wage interactions between matched pairs of workers and employers and by having these interactions iterated over time.
Case 2: Intermediation with Choice and Refusal
The buyer subset B and the seller subset S overlap but do not coincide. The pure buyers in V ¡S are the depositors (lenders), the buyer-sellers in B \ S are the intermediaries (banks), and the pure sellers in V ¡ B are the capital investors (borrowers). The depositors o®er funds to the intermediaries in return for deposit accounts, and the intermediaries o®er loan contracts to the capital investors in return for a share of earnings. The degree to which an accepted o®er results in satisfactory payo®s for the participants is determined by the degree to which the deposit or loan contract obligations are ful¯lled.
Case 3: A Labor Market with Endogenously Determined Workers and Employers
The subsets B and S coincide, implying that each tradebot can both make and receive trade o®ers. Each tradebot v can make up to O v work o®ers to tradebots at other work sites and receive up to A v work o®ers at his own work site. As in Case 1, the degree to which any accepted work o®er results in satisfactory payo®s for the participant tradebots is determined by subsequent work site interactions. Ex post, four pure types of tradebots can emerge: (1) pure workers, who work at the sites of other tradebots but have no tradebots working for them at their own sites; (2) pure employers, who have tradebots working for them at their own sites but who do not work at the sites of other tradebots; (3) unemployed tradebots, who make at least one work o®er to a tradebot at another site but who end up neither working at other sites nor having tradebots working for them at their own sites; and (4) inactive (out of the work force) tradebots, who neither make nor accept any work o®ers.
The determination of trade partners in the TNG is currently implemented using a modi¯ed version of the well-known Gale-Shapley (1962) deferred acceptance mechanism. This modi¯ed mechanism, hereafter referred to as the deferred choice and refusal (DCR) mechanism, presumes that each buyer and seller currently associates an expected payo® with each potential trade partner. Also, each buyer and seller is presumed to have an exogenously given minimum tolerance level, in the sense that he will not trade with anyone whose expected payo® lies below this level.
The DCR mechanism proceeds as follows. The buyer-seller matching outcomes generated by the DCR mechanism exhibit the usual static optimality properties associated with Gale-Shapley type matching mechanisms. First, any such matching outcome is core stable, in the sense that no subset of tradebots has an incentive to block the matching outcome by engaging in a feasible rearrangement of trade partners among themselves [Tesfatsion, 1997, Proposition 3.2] .
Second, de¯ne a matching outcome to be B-optimal if it is core stable and if each buyer matched under the matching outcome is at least as well o® as he would be under any other core stable matching outcome. Then, in each TNG trade cycle, the DCR mechanism yields the unique B-optimal matching outcome as long as each tradebot has a strict preference order over the potential trade partners he¯nds tolerable [Tesfatsion, 1997, Proposition 3.3] . As indicated by the computer experiments reported in Section 3.3 below, however, these static optimality properties do not appear to be adequate measures of optimality from an evolutionary perspective.
Trades are currently modelled in the TNG as prisoner's dilemma (PD) games. For example, a trade a defecting tradebot whose trade partner also defects; C is the payo® received by a cooperative tradebot whose trade partner also cooperates; and H (the temptation payo®) is the highest possible payo®, received by a defecting tradebot whose trade partner cooperates. More precisely, the payo®s are assumed to satisfy L < D < 0 < C < H; with (L + H)=2 < C. The payo® matrix for the PD game is depicted in Table 2 . The TNG tradebots are currently assumed to use a simple form of criterion¯lter 6 to update their expected payo®s on the basis of new payo® information. Speci¯cally, whenever a tradebot v receives a trade or refusal payo® P from an interaction with a potential trade partner k, tradebot v forms an updated expected payo® for k by taking a convex combination of this new payo® P and his previous expected payo® for k. The inverse of the weight on the new payo® P is 1 plus v's current payo® count with k. As explained in Tesfatsion (1997) , this updating procedure guarantees that the expected payo® tradebot v associates with k converges to the true average payo® v attains from interactions with k as the number of interactions between v and k becomes arbitrarily large. The trade behavior of each tradebot, whether he is a pure buyer in V ¡ S, a buyer-seller in B \ S, or a pure seller in V ¡ B, is currently characterized by a¯nite-memory pure strategy for playing a PD game with an arbitrary partner an inde¯nite number of times, hereafter referred to as a trade strategy. Each tradebot thus has a distinct trading personality even if he engages in both buying and selling activities. At the commencement of each trade cycle loop, tradebots have no information about the trade strategies of other tradebots; they can only learn about these strategies by engaging other tradebots in repeated trades and observing the payo® histories that ensue. Moreover, each tradebot's choice of an action in a current trade with a potential trade partner is determined entirely on the basis of the payo®s obtained in past trades with this same partner. Thus, each tradebot keeps separate track of the particular state he is in with regard to each of his potential trade partners.
In the current implementation of the TNG, the only aspect of a tradebot that evolves over time is his trade strategy. The evolution of the tradebots in each generation cycle is thus meant to re°ect the formation and transmission of new ideas rather than biological reproduction.
More precisely, each tradebot's trade strategy is represented as a¯nite state machine (FSM) with ā xed starting state. The FSMs for two illustrative trade strategies are depicted in Figure 1 : namely, a nice trade strategy, Tit-for-Two-Tats, that only defects if defected against twice in a row; and an opportunistic trade strategy, Rip-O®, that evolved in an experiment with an initial population of Tit-for-Two-Tats to take perfect advantage of the latter strategy by defecting every other time. 7 As is more carefully explained in
McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1997 , in each generation cycle the trade strategies (FSMs) associated with the current tradebot generation are evolved by means of a standardly speci¯ed genetic algorithm involving mutation, recombination, and elitism operations applied to bit string encodings for the strategies. The e®ect of these operations is that successful trade strategies are mimicked and unsuccessful trade strategies are replaced by variants of more successful strategies.
|INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE|
An Illustrative 5-Tradebot TNG
Consider a TNG for which the player set contains a total of¯ve buyer-seller tradebots who can both make and receive trade o®ers. 8 Each tradebot v has the same minimum tolerance level, 0. Also, each tradebot v has the same o®er quota, O v = 1, implying that he can have at most one trade o®er outstanding at any given time and can receive at most four trade o®ers from other tradebots at any given time. Each tradebot v is also assumed to have the same acceptance quota, A v = 4, which then implies that each tradebot is e®ectively unconstrained with regard to the number of trade o®ers he can have on his waiting list at any given time.
The refusal payo®, R, is assumed to be strictly negative, and the wall°ower payo®, W , is assumed to be 0. With regard to trade strategies, three of the tradebots are Tit-for-Two-Tats (TFTTs) and the remaining two tradebots are Rip-O®s (Rips); see Figure 1 . A TFTT receives a payo® sequence (C; C; C; :::) in repeated trades with another TFTT and a payo® sequence (L; C; L; C; :::) in repeated trades with a Rip, and a Rip receives a payo® sequence (H; C; H; C; :::) in repeated trades with a TFTT and a payo® sequence (D; C; C; :::) in repeated trades with another Rip. Note that a Rip never triggers defection in a TFTT since a Rip never defects twice in a row. Consequently, in any match-up between a TFTT and a Rip, the Rip would de¯nitely attain a higher¯tness score than the TFTT if the TFTT were not permitted to refuse the Rip's trade o®ers.
One key factor a®ecting the emergence of trade networks in the TNG is the speci¯cation of the tradebots' prior expected payo®s. Low prior expected payo®s encourage tradebots to latch on to the¯rst trade partner from whom they receive even a modestly high payo®. On the other hand, high prior expected payo®s encourage repeated experimentation with new trade partners in the face of continually disappointing payo®s from current trade partners. As will be seen below for the TFTTs, the combination of high prior expected payo®s and wide-spread experimentation can be detrimental to nice tradebots since it increases their chances of encountering opportunistically defecting trade partners whose defections are infrequent enough to avoid triggering refusals.
Two alternative benchmark assumptions will be considered for the tradebots' prior expected payo®s for their potential trade partners. The¯rst assumption, a common prior, is the assumption made in Another key factor a®ecting the types of trade networks that can emerge in the TNG is the extent to which the bene¯ts and costs associated with each potential trade partner balance out over time, either triggering eventual refusal or permitting long-term partnership. It is therefore useful to examine the various possible 2-tradebot match-ups for the illustrative 5-tradebot TNG before entering into an analysis of the full-blown model.
Given the form of the criterion¯lter that the tradebots use to update their expectations, a TFTT never judges another TFTT to be intolerable; for the expected payo® of a TFTT for another TFTT is always nonnegative. Similarly, a Rip never judges a TFTT to be intolerable. However, a Rip can become 
Possible Trade Networks Under Assumption (CP)
At the beginning of the initial trade cycle, each tradebot judges each other tradebot to be equally tolerable, and he uses random selection to submit a trade o®er to one of these tradebots. In turn, each tradebot places all received trade orders on his current waiting list, with no refusals. In accordance with the DCR mechanism, each tradebot then accepts all trade o®ers on his current waiting list.
Suppose that payo®s and prior expected payo®s are con¯gured as in (CP.1). In this case, even though a Rip receives the highest possible payo®, H, from an initial trade with a TFTT, which encourages him to submit another trade o®er to this TFTT in the next trade cycle, the TFTT neither submits trade o®ers to, nor accept trade o®ers from, this Rip after their¯rst trade. Moreover, the two Rips cease all trade activity with each other after their¯rst trade. Under the DCR mechanism, a tradebot receiving a refusal payo® from a refused trade o®er during the course of a trade cycle immediately submits a replacement trade o®er to any next-most-preferred tolerable tradebot who has not yet refused him. Consequently, by the end of thē rst four trade cycles, a Rip has triggered refusal in every one of his potential trade partners. Thereafter the Rip submits trade o®ers only to the TFTTS, receiving only negative refusal payo®s in return, until the expected payo® he associates with each TFTT¯nally drops below zero and he turns into a wall°ower.
In summary, by the end of the fourth trade cycle, the only trade networks that are viable for case (CP.1) involve trades among the three TFTTs, with both Rips ostracized and eventually reduced to wall°owers; cf. Figure 2(a) . The¯tness score of each TFTT thus tends towards the mutually cooperative payo®, C, whereas the¯tness score of each Rip tends toward the wall°ower payo®, 0. Whether of not the Rips survive and prosper in the generation cycle at the end of the trade cycle loop then depends on the length of this loop. Speci¯cally, in order for a Rip to end up with a higher¯tness score than the TFTTs, the loop must be short enough so that the H payo®s received by the Rip from his initial successful defections against the three TFTTs su±ciently outweigh the mutual defection payo®, D, that he receives from his one Rip-Rip trade, any refusal payo®s, R, that he receives from subsequent refused attempts to trade with the TFTTs, and any wall°ower payo®s, 0, that he receives after ceasing all trade activity.
|INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE| Cases (CP.2) and (CP.3) are similar to case (CP.1), except that the two Rips end up trading cooperatively with each other rather than as wall°owers; cf. Figure 2(b) . Also, in case (CP.3) the TFTTs may take longer to reject the opportunistically defecting Rips. The¯tness scores of all tradebots thus tend toward the mutually cooperative payo®, C, but it is now more likely that the Rips will have a higher¯tness score than the TFTTs at the end of any given trade cycle loop and hence a reproductive advantage in the subsequent generation cycle. that he essentially always prefers the TFTT with whom he has currently traded the least, and this leads him to repeatedly cycle his trade o®ers among the three TFTTs. As in the previous (CP.4) cases, the¯tness score of each Rip in this¯nal (CP.4) case tends toward (H +C)=2. In contrast to the previous (CP.4) cases, however, no TFTT now has any chance of escaping parasitization by all three Rips. Consequently, the¯tness score of all three TFTTs is uniformly bounded below C for all su±ciently long trade cycle loops. Here, then, is an example where optimistic prior expectations, leading to increased experimentation, turn out to be detrimental for the nicer tradebots.
Possible Trade Networks Under Assumption (LR)
Comparing the behavioral regions under (LR) with the behavioral regions under (CP), one sees that the TFTTs tend to behave more cautiously under (LR) because their prior expected payo®s are less optimistic. In particular, a TFTT's prior expected payo® for a Rip is bounded strictly below C under (LR) and may even be negative. Consequently, no TFTT ever submits a trade o®er to a Rip. Moreover, a TFTT will not accept an initial trade o®er from a Rip under (LR) unless the bene¯t, C, from a mutual cooperation is at least as great as the cost, ¡L, that is incurred when the Rip successfully defects against him.
Consider, now, the trade networks that can emerge under (LR). In the initial trade cycle, each TFTT uses random selection to submit a trade o®er to one particular TFTT, and all such trade o®ers are accepted. Each Rip likewise uses random selection to submit a trade o®er to one particular TFTT; but whether or not these trade o®ers are accepted depends on the behavioral region.
In case (LR.1), a TFTT refuses all trade o®ers from a Rip prior to any trades taking place. Under the DCR mechanism, a tradebot who has a trade o®er refused immediately submits a replacement trade o®er to any next-most-preferred tolerable tradebot who has not yet refused him. Thus, by the end of the initial trade cycle, each Rip has made one trade o®er to each TFTT which was refused, and one trade o®er to the other Rip which was accepted. Nevertheless, after this one trade, the Rips¯nd each other intolerable and never submit trade o®ers to each other again. In subsequent trade cycles each Rip only submits trade o®ers to the TFTTs, collecting negative refusal payo®s until,¯nally, his expected payo® for each TFTT drops below zero. Thereafter each Rip subsides into wall°owerdom; cf. Figure 3(a) .
|INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE| Case (LR.2) di®ers from case (LR.1) in only one respect|the Rips never¯nd each other intolerable. Thus, in the¯rst few trade cycles, each Rip uses sequential random selection to submit a trade o®er to each TFTT in turn, who refuses the o®er, and then to the other Rip, who accepts the o®er. Since each refusal results in a negative refusal payo®, R, the expected payo® that each Rip associates with each TFTT eventually drops below the expected payo® that each Rip has for the other Rip, which is always nonnegative. In each subsequent trade cycle the Rips submit trade o®ers only to each other; cf. Figure 3(b) .
The interesting aspect of both (LR.1) and (LR.2) is that each TFTT is able to use refusal to protect himself completely from the Rips, so that he never sustains any low L payo®s. The¯tness score of each TFTT at the end of the trade cycle loop is thus C, because C is the only payo® he ever experiences. In contrast, each Rip sustains negative refusal payo®s as well as at least one negative defection payo® beforē nally settling down either to wall°owerdom in case (LR.1) or to mutually cooperative trades with the other Rip in case (LR.2). Consequently, the¯tness score of each Rip at the end of any trade cycle loop is de¯nitely below C and may even be negative. It follows that each TFTT has a higher¯tness score than each Rip at the end of any trade cycle loop, and hence has a reproductive advantage over each Rip in the subsequent generation cycle.
Case (LR.3) is similar to case (LR.2), except that each Rip is able to obtain one high H payo® from each TFTT (in°icting a low negative L payo® on each TFTT in the process) before collecting refusal payo®s. It is therefore possible for a Rip to end up with a higher¯tness score than a TFTT in the subsequent generation cycle. In general, then, as depicted in Figure 3 Finally, suppose case (LR.4) holds. The TFTTs continue to submit trade o®ers only to each other in each successive trade cycle; but, unlike the previous (LR) cases, they never refuse trade o®ers received from a Rip. Consequently, a Rip never submits a trade o®er to the other Rip; for the trade o®ers he submits to the persistently more attractive TFTTs are never refused.
Indeed, not surprisingly, the behavior of the Rips in case (LR.4) is very similar to the eventual behavior of the Rips in case (CP.4) with U 0 = (H + C)=2. Throughout the trade cycle loop, each Rip randomly selects a TFTT to trade with after every even-numbered trade with a TFTT. The result is that, in every other trade cycle, each TFTT has a positive probability of becoming a host for each parasitic Rip for the next two trade cycles, and the Rips never trade with each other at all; cf. Figure 3(d) . It follows that each Rip ends up with a higher¯tness score than each TFTT, regardless of the length of the trade cycle loop.
Comparing Figure 3 with Figure 2 , the TFTTs have an easier time protecting themselves against the Rips in case (LR), where they have an accurate prior understanding of the payo®s they can expect to obtain from each type of tradebot. While this amount of information may be excessive, it does seem reasonable to suppose that, based on past bad experiences, nice tradebots develop more cautious priors for untested trade partners than do street-wise opportunistic tradebots on the look-out for chumps. Alternatively, nice tradebots might develop high minimum tolerance levels, so that refusal occurs quickly if trades go sour. Having a minimum tolerance level set equal to the wall°ower payo®, 0, is locally rational, in the sense that positive payo®s, however small, result in a better¯tness score for a player than no payo®s at all. Yet a myopic focus on increasing one's own¯tness score in absolute terms might not lead to reproductive success in the generation cycle if other opportunistic tradebots such as the Rips are doing even better; cf. cases (CP.4) and (LR.4). Ideally, then, prior expected payo®s and minimum tolerance levels should be allowed to evolve conjointly with the tradebots' strategies. Some preliminary simulation work along these lines in the context of the IPD/CR game can be found in Ashlock et al. (1996, Section 5.4).
Illustrative TNG Computer Experiments
Two types of TNG computer experiments are reported in this section: (a) buyer-seller market experiments, in which each tradebot is both a buyer and a seller; and (b) two-sided market experiments, in which a subset of buyer tradebots makes o®ers to a disjoint subset of seller tradebots. All experimental¯ndings were obtained using the C++ implementation of the TNG (version 104b) developed by McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1997,1999) . 9 For each experiment, multiple runs from di®erent initial random seeds are described. The following features are set commonly across all of these experimental runs.
The wall°ower payo® W is set at 0, the refusal payo® R is set at ¡0:6, the PD trade payo®s are set at L = ¡1:6, D = ¡0:6, C = 1:4, and H = 3:4, and each tradebot's minimum tolerance level is set at 0. Each tradebot assigns the same prior expected payo®, 1:4, to each other tradebot, implying that he is initially indi®erent concerning which trade partners he interacts with and is fairly optimistic about the payo®s he will receive; and each tradebot assigns a negative prior expected payo® to himself, thus ensuring that he never trades with himself. The total number of tradebots is set at 24, the number of generations is set at 50, and the number of trade cycles in each trade cycle loop is set at 150. Trade strategies are represented as 16-state¯nite state machines (FSMs) with¯xed starting states and with memory 1, where the memory is the number of bits used to encode the past actions of an opponent that can be recalled in any given internal FSM state. For implementation of the genetic algorithm, the number of elite trade strategies retained unchanged for the next generation is set at 16, where the elite trade strategies are the trade strategies that have attained the highest relative¯tness scores. Also, the probability of crossover is set at 1:0 and the probability of a bit mutation is set at 0:005. As outlined in Table 1 , each experimental run has the same dynamic structure. Each of the 24 tradebots in the initial tradebot generation is assigned a trade strategy encoded as a randomly generated bit string. The tradebots are then con¯gured in accordance with user-supplied parameter values, and a trade cycle loop commences. At the end of the trade cycle loop, the randomly generated bit strings that encode the trade strategies of the current tradebot generation are evolved by means of a genetic algorithm employing two-point crossover, bit mutation, and elitism. The evolved set of 24 bit strings decodes to an evolved 9 For more detailed computer experiments with alternative market structures, see Tesfation (1997).
set of 24 trade strategies (FSMs) that are reinitialized to their¯xed starting states and assigned to a new tradebot generation. This new tradebot generation is then con¯gured with user-supplied parameter values, and another trade cycle loop commences.
Buyer-Seller Markets
Each tradebot in these experiments was both a buyer and a seller, implying that he could both make and receive trade o®ers.
In the¯rst batch of buyer-seller experiments, the acceptance quota of each tradebot was set equal to the total number of tradebots, 24, and the o®er quota of each tradebot was set equal to 1. The tradebots were thus e®ectively unconstrained with regard to the number of trade o®ers they could have on their waiting lists at any given time.
As a benchmark, experiments were¯rst run with random partner matching in place of the DCR matching mechanism. Random partner matching was e®ected by preventing the updating of the prior expected payo® 1:4 that each tradebot initially assigned to each potential trade partner, so that all tradebots remained indifferent concerning their potential trade partners and matching was accomplished by the default mechanism of a random draw. Although occasionally the average¯tness score achieved by the tradebots under random matching rose to the mutual cooperation level, 1:4, a more typical outcome was a steady decline 10 to the mutual defection level, ¡0:6; see Figure 4 . The size of the refusal payo® is irrelevant for this¯nding, since refusals never occur in TNG experiments with random matching and nonbinding acceptance quotas.
|INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE|
When the DCR matching mechanism was then restored, the average¯tness score achieved by the tradebots typically evolved to the mutual cooperation level 1:4; see Figure 5 . These TNG experiments reinforce the previous IPD/CR¯ndings of Stanley et al. (1994) and Ashlock et al. (1996) that a preference-based matching mechanism tends to accelerate the emergence of mutual cooperation in the IPD when each agent is permitted both to make and to refuse game o®ers, is unconstrained with regard to the number of received o®ers he can accept, and is permitted to have at most one o®er outstanding at any given time.
|INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE|
In the second batch of buyer-seller experiments, all parameter settings were retained unchanged except that the acceptance quotas were reduced from 24 to 1. Each tradebot could thus retain at most one trade o®er on his waiting list at any one time; all other received trade o®ers had to be refused. Under random partner matching, the typical outcome was again the emergence of an average¯tness score close to the mutual defection payo® level, ¡0:6. This same outcome obtained even when refusal payo®s were omitted from¯tness scores, implying that refusal payo®s resulting from limited waiting lists were not a determining factor.
When the DCR matching mechanism was restored, however, the average¯tness score typically leveled out at about 1:25 instead of evolving to the mutual cooperation payo® level 1:4, the outcome for the¯rst batch of buyer-seller experiments. The explanation for this di®erence appears to lie in the changed nature of the refusal payo®s.
In the¯rst batch of buyer-seller experiments, the acceptance quota (24) was large relative to the o®er quota (1) . In these circumstances, tradebots are generally refused by other tradebots only if the latter¯nd them to be intolerable because of past defections. Negative refusal payo®s received in response to defections should rightly count against the¯tness of the trade strategies generating the defections, for this induces changes in these strategies in the generation cycle that tend to lead to higher future¯tness scores. In the second batch of buyer-seller experiments, however, the acceptance quota (1) was much smaller in relation to the o®er quota (1), implying that many more received trade o®ers had to be refused regardless of their desirability. In these circumstances, tradebots tend to accumulate large numbers of negative refusal payo®s purely as a consequence of the relatively small acceptance quota and the nature of the DCR mechanism, regardless of their trade strategies. Since the quotas and the DCR mechanism are not evolved in the current implementation of the TNG, penalizing the tradebots for these quota and DCR e®ects by including refusal payo®s in their individual¯tness scores tends to lower their current average¯tness score without inducing a higher average¯tness score in the future.
As expected, the average¯tness scores attained by the tradebots in the second batch of buyer-seller experiments markedly improved when refusal payo®s were removed from the calculation of the tradebots' individual¯tness scores; see Figure 6 . Improvement continued to occur when, in addition, the refusal payo®s were reduced in magnitude from ¡0:60 to ¡0:30; but a further reduction in magnitude to ¡0:06 and then to 0 resulted in increasingly volatile maximum and minimum average¯tness scores with no discernible improvement in average¯tness scores.
|INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE|
The probable cause of this increased volatility is that tradebots receiving refusals during initial trade cycles have little incentive to direct their o®ers elsewhere in subsequent trade cycles when the magnitude of the negative refusal payo® is small. A negative refusal payo® guarantees that the continually updated expected payo® that a tradebot associates with another tradebot who repeatedly refuses him eventually falls below 0, the minimum tolerance level, at which point he ceases making o®ers to this other tradebot. Nevertheless, this learning process is slow when the magnitude of the negative refusal payo® is small, and it is non-existent when the refusal payo® is simply set to 0.
Two-Sided Markets
In each two-sided market experiment, the 24 tradebots were evenly divided into 12 pure buyers (makers of trade o®ers) and 12 pure sellers (receivers of trade o®ers).
In the¯rst batch of experiments, the acceptance quota of each seller was set to 12 and the o®er quota of each buyer was set at 1. Thus, sellers were e®ectively unconstrained regarding the number of trade o®ers they could have on their waiting lists at any one time. Experiments were¯rst run with random partner matching in place of the DCR matching mechanism to obtain a benchmark for comparison. Interestingly, in contrast to buyer-seller experiments with nonbinding acceptance quotas and random matching, the average ¯tness score attained by the tradebots tended to fall to a level between ¡0:4 and the wall°ower payo® 0 rather than dropping all the way down to the mutual defection payo® level ¡0:6; compare Figure 7 with |INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE| When the DCR matching mechanism was restored, the average¯tness score of the tradebots typically evolved to about 1:2, a payo® level markedly below the mutual cooperation level 1:4 obtained in buyer-seller experiments with nonbinding acceptance quotas and DCR matching. Moreover, the maximum¯tness score, the average¯tness score, and the minimum¯tness score attained by the successive tradebot generations persistently deviated from one another. Compare Figure 8 with Figure 5 .
|INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE|
As detailed in Tesfatsion (1997, Proposition 3.3), the DCR mechanism is only guaranteed to be Pareto optimal for buyers, that is, for the active makers of trade o®ers. The e®ects of this bias on average¯tness scores is hidden in buyer-seller markets, where each tradebot is both a buyer and a seller. However, for twosided markets with buyer o®er quotas set equal to 1 and with nonbinding seller acceptance quotas, the DCR mechanism appears to result in a \separating equilibrium" in which the buyers are generally achieving high tness scores and the sellers are generally achieving low¯tness scores. In particular, the extreme pickiness of buyers combined with the acceptance by sellers of all tolerable received trade o®ers appears to allow buyers to form long-run parasitic relations with sellers, i.e., relations characterized by successful defections within the limits permitted by the sellers' 0 minimum tolerance levels. In the second batch of two-sided market experiments, all parameter speci¯cations were retained unchanged except that the seller acceptance quotas were decreased from 12 to 1. Thus, instead of accepting all tolerable received trade o®ers, the sellers now accepted at most one received trade o®er per trade cycle.
When benchmark experiments were¯rst run with random partner matching in place of the DCR mechanism, the typical outcome was the emergence of an average attained¯tness score close to the mutual defection payo®, ¡0:6. This result obtained whether or not refusal payo®s were counted in the calculation of individual tness scores. When the DCR matching mechanism was then restored, with refusal payo®s counted in the calculation of individual¯tness scores, the accumulation of refusal payo®s tended to result in an average attained¯tness score that was markedly below the mutual cooperation payo® level. When refusal payo®s were then omitted from the calculation of individual¯tness scores, the average attained¯tness score tended to evolve to the mutual cooperation level 1:4 and to be close to the maximum attained¯tness scores; see Figure 9 .
|INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE| Given the structuring of the two-sided market experiments currently under discussion, with equal numbers of buyers and sellers, common acceptance and o®er quotas, and tradebots who are initially indi®erent among their potential trade partners, the buyer o®er quota roughly predicts the number of trade o®ers that each seller will receive in the initial few trade cycles. The larger this number is, the more chance there is that mutually cooperative matches between buyers and sellers will be quickly discovered. On the other hand, if the seller acceptance quota is small relative to the buyer o®er quota, then many buyers will accumulate negative refusal payo®s unrelated to the nature of their trade strategies; and, if the seller acceptance quota is large relative to the buyer o®er quota, opportunistic buyers have a greater chance to seek out and exploit sellers within the limits allowed by their minimum tolerance levels. Either circumstance could slow or even prevent the sustained emergence of mutually cooperative behavior.
It might therefore be conjectured that mutually cooperative behavior will best be induced in the current experimental setting when the seller acceptance quota and the buyer o®er quota are equal and su±ciently large. Indeed, this turns out to be the case. In various two-sided market experiments with 12 pure buyers, 12 pure sellers, and equal seller and buyer quotas ranging from 3 to 12, the average¯tness score attained by the tradebots tended to evolve to the mutual cooperation payo® level and to be close to the maximum attained¯tness score even when refusal payo®s were included in the calculation of individual¯tness scores.
Concluding Remarks
The hallmark of the ACE approach to social and biological modelling is a bottom up perspective, in the sense that global behavior is grounded in local agent interactions. The agent-based trade network game (TNG) illustrates how the ACE approach can be specialized to an economic context. In particular, the analytical and simulation¯ndings presented in the previous section illustrate how the TNG is currently being used to study the evolutionary implications of alternative market structures at three di®erent levels: individual trade behavior; trade network formation; and social welfare as measured by average agent¯tness.
As currently implemented, however, the TNG only partially achieves the goal of a bottom up perspective. The TNG tradebots are surely more autonomous than agents in traditional economic models. For example, in order to determine their trade partners, the tradebots send messages back and forth to each other at event-triggered times. Nevertheless, they are still controlled by a main program that synchronizes the commencement of their trading activities and the evolution of their trade behavior. The advantage of imposing this synchronized dynamic structure is that it permits some analytical results to be obtained concerning the con¯guration, stability, uniqueness, and social optimality of the trade networks that emerge. The disadvantage is that these networks may not be robust to realistic relaxations of the imposed synchronizations.
As the TNG illustrates, then, the challenges to economists posed by the ACE approach are great and the payo®s are yet to be fully determined. Using the ACE approach, however, economists can at last begin to test seriously the self-organizing capabilities of decentralized market economies.
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